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The Gray Market Case:
Trademark Rights v. Consumer Interests
The term "gray market" refers to the importation and sale of
foreign goods in the United States by parties outside the manufac-
turer's authorized channel of distribution. In a typical fact pattern,1
a third party lawfully purchases genuine trademarked goods
abroad. The goods are then imported into the United States with-
out the consent of the domestic trademark owner, an exclusive dis-
tributor frequently owned or controlled by the manufacturer. An
unauthorized distributor then sells these gray market goods or par-
allel imports to consumers, generally at prices considerably less
than those charged by the authorized distributor.2
This market, accounting for perhaps $10 billion per year in im-
ports,3 has expanded dramatically in the past five years. 4 As a re-
sult, the long simmering conflict between trademark owners and
parallel importers has reached the boiling point. Trademark own-
ers, contending that parallel importers mislead consumers and un-
fairly "free ride" on the trademark owner's goodwill, advocate
prohibition of gray market imports under section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930. 5 Section 526 bars importation of foreign goods bear-
1 The variations in the gray market are myriad. The same company, related compa-
nies, or wholly separate companies may own the domestic and foreign trademark rights.
The goods of the trademark owner may be identical to, or different from, the parallel im-
port. Goods may be produced in the United States by the domestic trademark owner and
different or identical goods may be produced abroad by the United States owner or its
affiliates. Services and warranties may or may not be the same here and abroad. For a
discussion of various permutations in the gray market, see Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of
Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 5 WASH. L. REV. 433 (1982).
2 "A gray market is created when an arbitrageur takes advantage of a price difference
between two markets by buying in the market where prices are lower and selling in the
market where prices are higher." W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., 589 F. Supp.
763, 764 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
3 See Riley, "Gray Market" Fight Isn't Black and White, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 4
(gray market estimated at $10 billion per year). But market estimates vary. See, e.g., Critser,
Trade War Erupts in Gray-Market Goods, INC., March 1986, at 19 (gray market estimated at $7
billion in 1985).
4 The rapid escalation in parallel importation during the past five years resulted pri-
marily from the dramatic rise in the United States dollar relative to foreign currencies. As
the dollar rose, the profitability of gray market imports increased. The rise in the dollar,
however, did not cause the gray market; it simply made what was already profitable more
profitable. See note 108 infra and accompanying text. See generally Lexecon, Inc., The Eco-
nomics of Gray-Market Imports (May 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (available in the files
of the Notre Dame Law Review).
5 TariffAct of 1930, Pub. L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 590, 741 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
(1982)), states:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or
ing a registered United States trademark without the domestic
trademark owner's consent, provided that an American citizen, cor-
poration, or association owns the trademark and that it has been
recorded with the United States Customs Service.
In response, parallel importers argue that the gray market pro-
motes competition, maintains low prices, and protects consumer in-
terests. The gray marketeers advocate continued parallel
importation under current customs regulations, 6 which purport to
interpret section 526.7 These regulations deny the protections of
section 526 in two instances: (1) when the foreign and domestic
trademark owners are owned by the same person or entity or are
parent and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common
ownership or control; or (2) when the foreign goods bear a trade-
mark applied under the authorization of the domestic trademark
owner.
In three recent cases, United States trademark owners chal-
lenged the customs regulations as invalid interpretations of section
526 because they deny the protections of the statute to trademark
owners affiliated with foreign manufacturers.8 The courts upheld
the regulations, thereby allowing gray market importation to con-
tinue. These decisions demonstrated judicial reluctance to elimi-
nate all gray market importation, but failed to adequately recognize
accepted principles of trademark protection. The courts have yet
receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or associa-
tion created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States ... and if a copy
of the certificate of registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the
Treasury... unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at
the time of making entry.
6 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985) states that:
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical with
the one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or
association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure
and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth [above] do not apply to im-
ported articles when: (1) Both the foreign and the United States trademark or
trade name are owned by the same person or business entity; (2) The foreign and
domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidiary companies or
otherwise subject to common ownership and control... ; (3) The articles of for-
eign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied under authori-
zation of the United States owner.
7 The United States Customs Service, a branch of the Department of the Treasury, is
charged with the administration of § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1526
(1982)) and § 42 of the Lanham Trade-mark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982)).
8 See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal dock-
eted, No. 85-6282 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1985); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trade-
marks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-5890 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 28, 1984) (argued Jan. 22, 1986) [hereinafter cited as COPIA T; Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), afd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 1552
(Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
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to reconcile the conflicting goals of protecting the rights of trade-
mark owners and guarding the interests of consumers.
This note examines the conflict between trademark rights and
consumerism. Part I briefly traces the historical background of the
controversy. Part II argues that the customs regulations are an in-
valid interpretation of section 526. Part III discusses whether en-
forcement of section 526 adequately serves the policies underlying
protection of trademark rights and consumer interests. Part IV
considers several alternative solutions to the conflict, concluding
that parallel importation should continue, provided that Congress
establishes greater protection of both trademark rights and con-
sumer interests.
I. The History of the Gray Market Conflict
The conflict between section 526 and the customs regulations
stems from the 1921 decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel.9 This case in-
volved an American retailer who imported genuine trademarked
goods without the consent of the United States trademark owner.
The trademark owner purchased the trademark rights from the
French manufacturer and invested significant sums in acquiring
those rights and in developing the domestic market. The district
court enjoined such importation, but the Second Circuit reversed.
The Second Circuit explained that, because the goods were genu-
ine, no consumer deception or confusion and therefore no trade-
mark infringement existed.' 0  This holding followed the
universality theory of trademarks: a trademark legitimately applied
to goods anywhere in the world does not infringe an identical
trademark registered in the United States by the exclusive
distributor."
In response to the inequities12 it perceived in Katzel, Congress
quickly enacted section 526 as an amendment to the Tariff Act of
1922, then under consideration by Congress.' 3 Shortly after enact-
9 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921).
10 Id. at 543. Justice Hough, dissenting, argued that trademark laws protect the busi-
ness of the trademark owner from unfair competition, that the majority did not properly
consider the unfair appropriation of goodwill embodied in the United States trademark,
and that the genuineness of the goods should not be controlling as to the trademark in-
fringement issue. Id. (Hough, J., dissenting).
11 The Second Circuit had previously established, through a series of cases, the univer-
sality theory of trademarks by. denying protection to United States trademark owners
against trademarks legitimately applied to goods elsewhere in the world. See, e.g., Fred
Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F.
18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). These decisions controlled the Second Circuit holding in Katzel.
12 See notes 102-11 infra and accompanying text.
13 42 Stat. 858, 975. At the time Congress considered enactment of § 526, the
Supreme Court had already granted certiorari in Katzel. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 257
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ment of section 526, the Supreme Court reversed Katzel and found
actionable trademark infringement. 14 A unanimous Court noted
that the true significance of the mark was not to indicate the origin
or manufacturer of the goods, but rather to signify the local busi-
ness goodwill of the domestic owner of the mark. 15 Congress, in
enacting section 526, and the Supreme Court in Katzel, thus
adopted the territoriality theory of trademarks as applied to genu-
ine goods: a trademark has a separate legal existence under each
country's laws and its proper function is to symbolize the domestic
goodwill of the domestic mark holder. 16
Section 526 remains unchanged today in relevant part despite
congressional consideration on several different occasions.17 The
U.S. 630 (1921). Apparently Congress was anxious to move more quickly. Section 526 was
proposed as a floor amendment to the Tariff Act. The Senate debated the Act briefly and
amended it once during the debate. Congress then amended again in joint conference.
Because of the haste to enact corrective legislation, the debate was unfocused and mis-
informed. See notes 49-50 infra and accompanying text.
14 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
15 Id. at 691-92. Justice Holmes indicated that Bourjois had control and ownership of
the mark and had made considerable investments in the mark itself, in advertising, and in
quality control. Id. at 690-91. Due to Bourjois' efforts and expenditures, the Court said
that the public understood the trademark in the United States to signify that the goods
came from Bourjois and not from the foreign manufacturer. Id. at 692. The Court did not
make reference to § 526 in its opinion.
16 Several Supreme Court opinions reflect the territoriality of trademark rights. These
opinions ground the doctrine in the independent sovereignty of nations. See, e.g., Osawa &
Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing cases). For an excel-
lent discussion of the territoriality doctrine, see id. at 1171-74. See also Weil Ceramics and
Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 705-06 (D.NJ. 1985); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v.
Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983); Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 47 VA. L. REv. 733,
736-37, 750 (1961) (establishment by domestic markholder of local goodwill justifies trade-
mark protection against gray market imports); Derenberg, Current Trademark Problems in For-
eign Travel and the Import Trade, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 674, 690-96 (1958) (trademarks are
territorially independent and may be separately controlled and owned in different countries
by different persons); Note, Discrimination Against Foreign Owners of U.S. Trademarks Under 19
U.S.C. § 1526, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 423, 435-40 (1984) (United States has
undertaken obligations through the Pan-American Convention and the Paris Convention to
accord to nationals of other signatories the same trademark rights accorded to United
States nationals). But see Callman, Worldmarks and Antitrust Law, 11 VAND. L. REv. 515, 518-
19 (1958) (goodwill associated with a worldmark can only have one situs and that situs is
where the goods are manufactured). A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923),
provides additional support for the territoriality approach. In a similar action arising under
§ 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 (predecessor to § 42 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act),
the Aldridge Court held that Customs must exclude from entry genuine goods bearing a
registered trademark. Id. at 676.
17 In 1930, Congress repealed the Tariff Act of 1922 and enacted the Tariff Act of 1930
without changing § 526. See 46 Stat. 590, 741. In 1944, the bill which ultimately became
the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946 would have merged § 526 of the Tariff Act into § 27
of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 (currently § 42 of the Lanham Act). Testimony at the hear-
ing by an Antitrust Division witness criticized the bill as allowing exclusion of goods in ways
the Antitrust Division thought anti-competitive. See Hearings on H.R. 82 Before A Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, 68 (1944). As a result, § 526 remained
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customs regulations have a more erratic history. The initial regula-
tions, adopted in 192318 and in 1931, t9 were fully consistent with
the statute. In 1936, Customs amended its regulations, without ex-
planation, by adding the provision that Customs would not bar a
genuine foreign trademarked good from importation if "the same
person or entity" owned the foreign and domestic marks.20 In
1953, Customs once again amended its regulations without expla-
nation, expanding the "same person or entity" exemption to in-
clude "related companies," 21 but then retreated in 1959 back to the
1936 regulations.2 2 As a result of these frequent changes, Customs
inconsistently enforced its own regulations. 23
unchanged and Congress enacted the Lanham Act without merging § 526 into § 42 of the
Act.
In 1954, Congress was presented with a bill which would have made § 526 inapplicable
when the U.S. trademark owner was affiliated in any way with the foreign manufacturer. See
H.R. 9476, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). This bill would have merged the customs regula-
tions into § 526. That portion of the bill, however, was removed by unanimous consent
during the House hearings with the concurrence of the Treasury Department. See Hearings
on H.R. 9476 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954).
In 1959, the administration-sponsored Celler Bill was introduced to repeal § 526, but
no hearings were held and the bill was never reported out of committee. See H.R. 7234,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The bill was highly controversial and hotly debated, pitting
trademark property rights against antitrust concerns. See generally Bicks, Antitrust and Trade-
mark Protection Concepts in the Import Field, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 1255 (1959); Vandenburgh,
The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is Not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK
REP. 707 (1959); Derenberg, Current Trademark Problems in Foreign Travel and the Import Trade,
49 TRADEMARK REP. 674 (1959); Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-the
Role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1969).
In 1978, Congress amended § 526 (and § 42 of the Lanham Act) by creating an excep-
tion for goods imported for personal use or consumption. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (1982).
Congress did not, in any way, amend § 526(a).
18 See Customs Regulations of 1923, art. 476 (superseded 1931).
19 See Customs Regulations of 1931, art. 518(a) (superseded 1936).
20 See T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936) (superseded 1953). The regulations,
which previously dealt solely with § 526, were amended to encompass only § 27 of the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905. The Tariff Commission (predecessor to the International Trade
Commission) noted in 1944 that genuine goods were properly barred from importation
under § 526 when the U.S. and foreign marks were owned by the same person, since the
customs regulations promulgated in 1936 did not apply to § 526. See Hearings on H.R. 82
Before A Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, 86-87 (1944).
21 See T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 383-84 (1953) (superseded 1959). Customs
amended the regulations to expand the "same person or entity" ownership requirement to
also include those situations where marks were owned by companies that were "related"
within the meaning of § 45 of the Lanham Act. Once again, Customs provided no explana-
tion for the changes in the regulations.
22 See T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433-34 (1959) (superseded 1972).
23 See note 17 supra (1944 enforcement); notes 25 (1957 enforcement) and 72 infra and
accompanying text. See also Note, The Greying ofAmerican Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclu-
sion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation C.F.R. § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 98-
101 (1985).
One commentator has suggested that Customs often excluded goods in spite of the
regulations because of lack of information stemming from prior inconsistent reporting re-
quirements. See Atwood, supra note 17, at 307. Customs thus may not have been aware of
all facts relating to the relationship between the trademark owners and the foreign manu-
(Vol. 61:838
In 1972, Customs promulgated the current regulations, 24
adopting the antitrust doctrines set forth in United States v. Guerlain,
Inc. 25 These consolidated "perfume cases" held that the American
part of a single international enterprise could not properly bar gen-
uine imports under section 526. The district court held that such
use of section 526 by an exclusive distributor constituted monopo-
lization of the market for its trademarked goods in violation of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.26 However, both the courts27 and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice28 have since re-
jected the antitrust theories of Guerlain. The Customs Service now
argues that the 1972 regulations are valid upon other grounds. 29
Because of the substantial increase in gray market imports in
the early 1980s, 30 trademark owners attempted to convince Cus-
toms to modify its regulations.3  Impatient with subsequent delays
facturers. See also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 432 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984); Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc. at 50 n.16, COPIAT, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28,
1984).
24 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b), (c)(I)-(3) (1985) (relevant text at note 6 supra).
25 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed
with preudice, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). This case involved consolidation of three
antitrust actions against perfume distributors. These exclusive distributors were domestic
trademark owners affiliated with foreign manufacturers. The stimulus for the action was
Customs' use of § 526 to bar the importation of gray market goods. Customs authorities
deemed themselves legally required to exclude parallel exports.
Customs provided no explanation for the 1972 regulations in either the notice propos-
ing (35 Fed. Reg. 19,269 (1970)) or adopting (37 Fed. Reg. 20,677 (1972)) the new regula-
tions. The Secretary of the Treasury, however, has maintained until very recently that the
1972 regulations were based upon Guerlain. See W. Allen, International Licensing-The
Potential Domestic Consequences 29 (Feb. 1986) (unpublished paper presented to Am.
Intell. Prop. Ass'n) (available in the files of the Notre Dame Law Review).
26 See Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 87. But see notes 56-68 infra and accompanying text.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), provides: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .
27 See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
28 See text accompanying note 64 infra (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 15 n.12, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief]).
In rebuttal, the Civil Division of the Justice Department (representing the Treasury
Department and the Customs Service in civil litigation) claimed that the views of the Anti-
trust Division are "not binding on the government and should be treated as simply expres-
sing another viewpoint." Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc., supra note 23, at 52-53 (citing
the Justice Department brief in the Court of International Trade in Vivitar, 593 F. Supp.
420).
29 See text accompanying notes 42-55 and 69-94 infra.
30 See Riley, supra note 3, at 1, col. 3-4.
31 In April 1982, Vivitar Corp. urged Customs to rescind the regulations as contrary to
the plain language of § 526. Customs drafted a notice of proposed rulemaking to that ef-
fect, but the initiative was stalled by special interest groups lobbying for continued gray
market importation. See Victor, Preventing Importation of Products in Violation of Property Rights,
53 ANrrrusT LJ. 783, 798 (1984).
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in governmental policy studies, 32 the trademark owners turned to
private litigation.33 In three recent cases, trademark owners have
directly challenged the validity of the customs regulations. 34 The
central issue in each case was whether the customs regulations, by
limiting the scope of section 526, are consistent with that statute.
All three courts sustained the validity of the regulations. 35
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States,36 the only appellate decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the regulations
do not properly interpret section 526 and are not controlling with
respect to the scope of the statute.37 Nevertheless, the court char-
acterized the regulations as no more than a definition of Customs'
role in its administration of the statute.38 Thus, the court upheld
the regulations as "a reasonable exercise of administratively initi-
ated enforcement,"3 9 a theory neither briefed nor argued by the
parties.40 Rather than having Customs enforce trademark rights at
the border, the court suggested that United States trademark own-
ers should adjudicate their rights in federal district court. If suc-
cessful, the trademark owner would then be "entitled to have the
parallel imports excluded by Customs." 41
32 In 1983, the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade (now part of the Economic
Policy Council) directed its Working Group on Intellectual Property (WGIP) to study the
issue of gray market importation and prepare a recommendation for the President. Id. Per-
ceiving the need for more information on the economic effects of parallel imports, the
WGIP requested additional economic data in May 1984. See 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453 (1984).
The WGIP has not yet made its recommendations.
33 See, e.g., Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983),
vacating 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Int'l, 709
F.2d 1517, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (9th Cir. 1983); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash,
618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19
(S.D. Fla. 1985); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re
Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, reported at [July-Dec] INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 1, at 767 (Dec. 19, 1984), disapproved by President, reported at 50 Fed. Reg. 1,655
(1985), appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell, Inc. v. United States ITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla.
1983).
34 See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal dock-
eted, No. 85-6282 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1985); COPIAT v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844
(D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984) (argued Jan. 22, 1986);
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affd on other grounds,
761 F. 2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
35 See Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 922; COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 851-52; Vivitar, 593 F.
Supp. at 436.
36 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
37 See id. at 1570.
38 See id. at 1569.
39 Id. at 1570-71.
40 Neither party in Vivitar represented that the regulations were anything other than an
interpretation of the statute or that the regulations covered less than the full reach of the
statute. See Allen, supra note 25, at 36.
41 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. The effectiveness of this remedy depends, however, upon
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II. Analysis of the Validity of the Customs Regulations
Courts have upheld the customs regulations on alternative
grounds: (1) the legislative history of section 526, (2) the antitrust
doctrines set forth in Guerlain, (3) deference to agency interpreta-
tion, (4) congressional acquiescence, and (5) the authority and/or
discretion vested in the Customs Service to limit the scope of sec-
tion 526.
A. The Legislative History of Section 526
The most persuasive argument for invalidating the customs
regulations is the lack of ambiguity of the language of section
526.42 The text of section 526 does not indicate that Congress in-
tended the protections of the statute to turn on subtleties of corpo-
rate relationships. When Congress has desired such a distinction, it
has known precisely how to write a statute to accomplish that
objective.43
Nevertheless, courts have glossed over the plain meaning of
the statute44 despite government statements that the courts should
consider section 526 "in accord with the normal meaning of the
statutory language." 45 Instead, the courts have focused on legisla-
tive history. The central question is whether Congress meant what
it said or whether Congress merely intended to correct the inequi-
ties of the Second Circuit decision in Katzel.46 The latter argument
suggests that courts should restrict section 526 to the facts of Katzel
Customs' interpretation of the Vivitar dicta. The opinion did not explicitly define the scope
of protection available. It is unclear whether an exclusionary order would encompass only
the gray market goods imported by named defendants or would exclude all parallel im-
ports. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and for Clarification at 9, Vivitar, 761 F.2d
1552.
42 See Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 921 ("Section 526 read literally would indeed give
[Olympus] the right to exclude all goods bearing the Olympus trademark."); ivitar, 593 F.
Supp. at 425 (the literal language of § 1526(a) supports Vivitar's right to require exclusion
of all goods bearing the Vivitar trademark). When the terms of a statute are unambiguous,
judicial inquiry is complete except in "rare and unusual circumstances. . . . And there
must be something to make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not
to prevail." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978). In interpreting a statute, one starts
with the statutory words as the best evidence of what the legislature intended. Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 144 (1984).
43 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act § 101(16), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) (1982); Foreign
Agents Registration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2386(A) (1982).
44 See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195 (1983) (The plain meaning rule "has effectively been laid to rest.
No occasion for statutory construction now exists when the Court will not look at the legisla-
tive history." (emphasis in original)).
45 Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 8-9, quoted in Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
46 Judge Learned Hand correctly noted that "[h]ad the Supreme Court reversed [Kat-
ze/], [§ 526] would not have been enacted at all." Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F.
264, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). But, as his cousin, Judge Augustus Hand, later observed,
Katzel "doubtless brought about the legislation ... but this fact does not settle the scope of
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and should therefore apply it only to independent trademark own-
ers unaffiliated with a foreign manufacturer.47 Unfortunately, the
legislative history is sparse and sheds very little light on congres-
sional intent. As the court in Vivitar concluded, "no limitations,
based upon congressional intent at the time of enactment, can be
read into the statute." 48
Constant reference to the facts of Katzel dominated the brief
Senate floor debate in 1922. Some Senators construed the lan-
guage of section 526 as reaching beyond the facts of Katzel,49 but
many Senators misunderstood the facts of the case.50 Although the
conference committee report 51 provides some support for a
broader interpretation of the statute,5 2 "the [Senate] debate is too
unfocused and misinformed to serve as any definitive basis for in-
terpretation of [section 526]." 53
The effort to discern the legislative intent of Congress in 1922
"turns legal research into quasi-archeology." 54 The attempt to
"contradict [section 526's] plain meaning by snatching at fragments
the act." Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931). See Note, supra
note 23, at 96-98.
47 See Note, supra note 23, at 92 n.38.
48 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565.
49 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-05 (1922). There was obvious concern not just about in-
dependent trademark owners, but about foreign control. For example, Senator Edge asked
whether a foreign manufacturer could, through an agent in this country, register his trade-
marks and then control the distribution of goods bearing those trademarks. Id. at 11,605.
Concern over foreign control was later resolved in committee. See note 51 infra. For more
extensive discussions of the Senate debates, see Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1562-63; Note, supra
note 23, at 91-93 nn.35-40.
50 Some Senators obviously believed that Katzel involved importation by the very com-
pany that had sold the trademark rights. They thus assumed that a species of fraud had
been practiced. See 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922). The presence of fraud, however, was
expressly negated in the conference committee report ultimately approved by Congress.
See note 51 infra.
51 See H.R. REP. No. 1233, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922). The report stated that:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing law does not
prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same trade-mark as merchan-
dise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is genuine and if there is no
fraud upon the public. The Senate amendment makes such importation unlawful
without the consent of the owner of the American trade-mark, in order to protect
the American manufacturer or producer; and the House recedes with an amend-
ment requiring that the trade-mark be owned, at the time of importation, by a
citizen of the United States or by a corporation or association created or organized
within the United States.
52 The committee reports are the most clear and authoritative legislative history and
are an infinitely more reliable guide to congressional intent than floor debates. Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969). They reflect "the considered and collective understanding
of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation." Id.
53 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1563.
54 N. Lewin, The Ten Commandments of Parallel Importation 1 (Oct. 23, 1985) (un-
published paper presented to Second Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Ct. Int'l
Trade) (available in the files of the Notre Dame Law Review).
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from its legislative history is unconvincing [and there is] no compel-
ling reason to doubt that the statute means what it says."5 5 Neither
the language nor the legislative history contains any indication of
any intent by Congress to limit the scope of section 526 based upon
distinctions in corporate relationships.
B. The Guerlain Rationale
Customs originally based the current regulations upon United
States v. Guerlain, Inc.,56 thereby implementing Customs' perception
of antitrust policy as of 1972. But Guerlain conflicted with antitrust
law when the court decided it57 and it was vacated and dismissed
upon the Antitrust Division's own request.58 More importantly, the
Guerlain analysis conflicts with current antitrust law.
The Guerlain court determined that the foreign manufacturer
and the United States trademark owner constituted a "single inter-
national enterprise" 59 and constructed a "relevant market" consist-
ing of transactions in a single trademarked product.60 The court
held that the use of section 526 to exclude gray market imports was
monopolization of or an attempt to monopolize the relevant market
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.61
Courts have since repudiated this extremely narrow definition
of "relevant market" as a predicate for antitrust liability.62 Under
current law, a trademark owner seeking exclusion of gray market
goods which may reduce or eliminate intrabrand competition does
not possess sufficient market power to monopolize the relevant
market if significant interbrand competition exists.63 Thus, the An-
titrust Division admitted in 1983 that "[t]o the extent that [Guerlain]
55 Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
56 See note 25 supra. See also COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 851.
57 See generally United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956);
Handler, Trademarks-Assets or Liabilities?, 48 TRADEMARK REP. 661 (1958).
58 While the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department moved
to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the complaint. The case was remanded and dis-
missed with prejudice. Guerlain has no precedential value, even for another court, because
the Supreme Court vacated thejudgment. See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S.
625, 634 n.6 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577-78 n.12 (1975). The Gov-
ernment took such action because the Customs Service felt constrained to exclude imports
under authority of § 526 while the Antitrust Division advocated free importation on anti-
trust grounds. The Solicitor General thus indicated that the Administration would recom-
mend legislation to reconcile the conflicting views of the Executive branch. The result was
the ill-fated Celler bill. See note 17 supra. See also Note, supra note 23, at 94 nn.53-54.
59 See Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 82.
60 See id. at 83-87.
61 See id. at 87. See also note 26 supra.
62 See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1982); Muenster Bu-
tane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1981).
63 See Victor, supra note 31, at 801. "Interbrand competition is the competition among
the manufacturers of the same generic product.., and is the primary concern of antitrust
law .... In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors-
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held that each trademarked good constituted a separate product
market solely because of the protection afforded by the trademark,
its analysis is inconsistent with current legal precedent and sound
economic analysis." '6 4
Although courts have repudiated the antitrust reasoning of
Guerlain, the fact remains that Guerlain alone formed the basis of the
Customs Service regulations. 65 Even if the Guerlain reasoning was
valid, the wisdom and necessity for such customs regulations is
questionable.66 The Customs Service does not possess antitrust ex-
pertise or authority, 67 and "[a]ntitrust questions are far too com-
plex to reasonably be decided by reference to a short questionnaire
on corporate ownership." 68
C. Deference to Administrative Interpretation
Courts have relied, in part, upon deference to "longstanding
and consistent administrative interpretation" of section 526 as
grounds for upholding the customs regulations. 69 While courts
should defer to reasonable interpretations by agencies administer-
ing a statute, deference must stop when the agency's reading can-
not reasonably be harmonized with the statute's terms. 70 No
reasonable way exists to harmonize the customs regulations with
the language of section 526.
Moreover, the amount of deference owed depends upon the
"thoroughness, validity and consistency of an agency's reason-
wholesale or retail-of the product of a particular manufacturer." Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
64 Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 15 n.12.
65 See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 851; note 25 supra.
66 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177-78. The regulations are "unsound both as antitrust
policy and as trademark law."
67 The only governmental agencies accorded general antitrust enforcement powers are
the justice Department, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1982), and the Federal Trade Commission, id.
§ 21. While special antitrust enforcement powers have been granted in specific areas of
commerce, the FTC has been entrusted with enforcement powers over all other areas of
commerce. Id. § 21(a).
68 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177.
69 See Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 922; COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 851; Vivitar, 593 F. Supp.
at 432-33. But see Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
70 The Court of International Trade in Vivitar and the district court in COPIAT each
considered the customs regulations to be a "reasonable" interpretation of the statute, yet
made no attempt to harmonize the statutory language with the interpretation. See COPIAT,
598 F. Supp. at 851-52; Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 433-34. Yet, in the cases the COPIAT court
cited for authority, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to rationalize how the statu-
tory language and the agency interpretation could be harmonized. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (harmonizing the word "charity"); Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (harmonizing the "public interest standard").
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ing."7' Customs' reasoning has been erratic72 and is invalid in light
of current antitrust law.73 The only deference courts should afford
Customs' interpretations of section 526 is to the contemporaneous
1923 and 1931 regulations which were entirely consistent with sec-
tion 526.7 4
Courts do, albeit infrequently, find an implied exception to a
statute, difficult or impossible to discern on its face, to avoid an
absurd result that the legislature could not have intended.75 Yet
granting protection to valuable property rights is surely not an ab-
surd result. Courts cannot ignore Congress' decision simply be-
cause the agency believes Congress should have taken another
view. Thus, the deference arguments are not persuasive. 76
D. Congressional Acquiescence
Courts have also upheld the customs regulations under the
doctrine of Haig v. Agee. 77 When Congress knows of an agency in-
terpretation and Congress either amends the statute in part or re-
fuses to act, the administrative interpretation is presumed
consistent with the statute. 78 Under this view, Congress ratified the
customs regulations each time it considered section 526 without al-
tering the main provisions of the statute.79
The counter-arguments are more persuasive. Each time Con-
gress has been presented with a clear opportunity to integrate the
regulations into section 526, it has declined to do so.80 Also, evi-
dence exists which shows that Congress was not always fully in-
71 Federal Elections Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27,
37 (1981).
72 See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text. Between 1923 and 1935, the agency
interpretation was consistent with the statute. Between 1936 and 1957, the agency inter-
pretation technically applied only to § 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 (see note 20 supra)
and was never explained publicly. Between 1957 and 1983, the agency based its interpreta-
tion upon antitrust policies in Guerlain which have since been repudiated. Since 1983, the
agency has based its interpretation upon legislative history, congressional acquiescence, or
deference to longstanding practices. See also Note, supra note 23, at 98-101.
73 See text accompanying notes 56-64 supra and notes 124-42 infra.
74 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978). See also notes 18-
19 supra and accompanying text.
75 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892). But courts
should apply this rule only in rare circumstances. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S.
544, 555 (1979).
76 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568 ("the 'long standing administrative interpretation' argu-
ment.., does not afford a basis for a definitive statutory interpretation.").
77 453 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1981).
78 See Olympus, 627. F. Supp. at 922; COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 851-52; Vivitar, 593 F.
Supp. at 432-33. But see Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
79 See note 17 supra.
80 See id. "[I]t is particularly risky to draw inferences from subsequent congressional
refusals to act." Wald, supra note 44, at 205 (emphasis in original). There are many reasons
why Congress might have rejected particular legislation. But it is equally as valid to say
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formed as to the scope of the customs regulations.8' Finally, the
evidence of congressional ratification is not of the compelling na-
ture that courts usually require when relying on the doctrine.8 2
The Vivitar court concluded that "legislation by total silence is too
tenuous a theory to merit extended discussion."83
E. Authority to Promulgate Regulations
Section 526 expressly directs Customs to enforce the law by
seizing genuine trademarked goods imported without the trade-
mark owner's consent.8 4 Nevertheless, courts have simply assumed
that Customs has the authority to promulgate regulations which
deny the protections of the statute to certain trademark owners.8 5
Alternatively, the Vivitar court concluded that, even without such
authority, Customs has the discretion to decide whether to enforce
the statute to its full reach.8 6
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of
section 526 suggest that Congress granted Customs the power to
reshape or limit the scope of the statute. Section 526 does not pro-
vide the agency with sweeping powers nor does it direct the agency
to protect the "public interest."8 7 The language of section 526 is
commanding and contemplates full enforcement of the statute. As
Congress ratified the statute as it is to say Congress ratified the regulations. See Note, supra
note 23, at 95-96 nn.61-62.
81 Congress was not fully informed of the scope of the customs regulations in 1978
when it amended § 526. The reports of the Senate committee and the conference commit-
tee describe § 526 simply as "prohibit[ing] importation of goods bearing a trademark
owned by a corporate or real citizen of the United States .... " S. REP. No. 778, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 1517, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978). In con-
trast, the House committee report takes notice of the 1972 customs regulations, but does
not mention corporate relationships or the "same ownership" or "common control" provi-
sions of the regulations. See H.R. REP. No. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977). Congres-
sional acquiescence to an administrative interpretation requires that "Congress must not
only have been made aware of the administrative interpretation, but must also have given
some 'affirmative indication' of such intent." Association of Am. Railroads v. ICC, 564 F.2d
486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
82 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 599-602 (racial discrimination); Agee, 453 U.S. at 299-
300 (threat to national security). See also Note, supra note 23, at 96 n.62 (distinguishing
Agee).
83 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
84 See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(b) (1982) ("Any such merchandise imported into the United
States in violation of the provisions of [§ 1526(a)] shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture
for violation of the customs laws." (emphasis added)).
85 Several courts have avoided the authority issue. Instead, they have apparently as-
sumed that the regulations were properly issued pursuant to general authority under 19
U.S.C. § 1624 (1982). The courts have focused instead upon the deference and congres-
sional acquiescence arguments. See notes 69 and 78 supra and accompanying text. But see
Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569 (Congress did not delegate legislative authority to Customs).
86 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569-70.
87 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (discussing the
broad "public interest" standard of the Communications Act).
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the Vivitar court stated, "we find no language in the statute by
which Congress delegated ... legislative authority to the Secretary
of the Treasury in connection with [the] administration of [section
526]."88
To the extent that special authority does exist under section
526, it has been granted expressly by congressional amendment.
For example, in 1978 Congress empowered Customs to determine
what products may be brought into the United States for personal
consumption, 9 an area of unique Customs expertise. In contrast,
Customs has no special expertise either in trademark or antitrust
matters. "Nothing in the statute suggests that Congress conferred
authority on ...Customs to condition its benefits on Customs'
analysis of antitrust policy." 90
Justifying the customs regulations as mere discretionary en-
forcement guidelines is equally questionable. Following the sur-
prising91 Vivitar decision, both trademark owners and gray
marketeers have argued persuasively that discretionary enforce-
ment is contrary to the language of section 526,92 to Supreme
Court decisions, 93 and to the agency's own position and practices.94
Thus, little dispute exists that the enforcement duties of Customs
are coextensive with the scope of section 526.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that there is little legal
foundation for the customs regulations. The regulations are not
supported by the legislative intent of the statute, the underlying an-
titrust rationale, the deference owing to agency interpretation, or
the congressional acquiescence doctrine. Moreover, the Customs
Service does not have the necessary authority to promulgate such
regulations. As a matter of law, section 526 must be enforced.
The ultimate question, however, is whether section 526 should
be enforced. It is therefore necessary to consider, and then strike a
proper balance between, the policies underlying the protection of
88 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
89 See note 17 supra.
90 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177.
91 See note 40 supra.
92 See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants at 30, COPIAT, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28,
1984) ("Th[e] language [of § 526(b)] clearly contemplates Customs enforcement of the full
lawful scope of section 526(a) at the point of entry."); Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc.,
supra note 23, at 54-55 ("The statute does not authorize Customs to pick and choose when
it will and when it will not exercise its obligation to detain prohibited goods. Hence the
Federal Circuit is simply wrong when it implies that 'Customs is not required to exclude' all
the goods defined by (§ 526(a)].").
93 See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (Customs is required to exclude
gray market imports). See also note 16 supra.
94 Customs authorities have always deemed themselves legally constrained to exclude
goods they considered prohibited by § 526. See, e.g., note 25 supra.
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intellectual property rights and the protection of consumer
interests.
III. The Policy Considerations
A trademark95 performs several functions which deserve pro-
tection: (1) it acts as the objective symbol of the goodwill or repu-
tation which a business has created for its product;96 (2) it identifies
the seller's goods and distinguishes them from goods sold by an-
other;97 (3) it signifies that all goods bearing the trademark come
from a single source;98 (4) it signifies that all goods bearing the
trademark are of an equal level of quality; 99 and (5) it serves as the
prime instrument in selling and advertising the goods.
Protection of trademarks serves diverse private and public in-
terests.1 00 In addition, societal norms encourage vigorous competi-
tion and low prices, yet seek to prohibit unfair competition and
commercial immorality. The challenge in the gray market is to find
the proper policy balance between fair competition and free com-
petition'0 1 while maximizing consumer protection.
95 "The term 'trade-mark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combina-
tion thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
96 See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 208
(1942); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916); S. REP. No. 1333,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946) ("Where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats."). See generally I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 2:10 (2d ed. 1984).
97 A major purpose of trademarks is "to protect the public so that it may be confident
that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark that it favorably knows, it will
get the product which it asks for and wants to get." S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1946). See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 96, § 3:2.
98 Historically trademarks indicated the physical source of origin of the goods, but the
source function of trademarks is now more broadly construed. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distil-
ling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1963) ("Buyers are entitled to
assume that all products carrying the same trademark are somehow linked with, or spon-
sored by, a single anonymous source."). See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 96, § 3:3.
99 The trademark indicates a unified source of quality control. Thus, the dual nature of
a trademark is either to indicate source or quality or both, depending upon manner of use.
See, e.g., Application of Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 n.15 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
("[A] mark primarily functions to indicate a single quality control source of the goods.").
See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 96, § 3:4.
100 See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text. Trademark owners are protected
against diversion of sales and pirating of goodwill. The trademark also protects the con-
suming public from deception and likelihood of confusion.
101 See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 96, § 2:2. Trademark law is a branch of the
broader area of unfair competition. While trademark law focuses upon the total physical
image given by the product and its mark, unfair competition is much broader in scope and
encompasses buyer confusion between two products based upon the total impact of all
aspects of a party's selling efforts. Id. As in the case of trademark infringement, likelihood
of confusion is the cornerstone of unfair competition. The law of unfair competition there-
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A. Protection of Trademark Rights in the Gray Market
Advocates of the gray market argue that once a foreign trade-
mark owner introduces genuine trademarked goods into the stream
of commerce, his right of control ends and an affiliated United
States trademark owner has no right to control their ultimate dispo-
sition.1o 2 This exhaustion theory is flawed because it ignores the
territoriality doctrine expressed in section 526 and Katzel: in inter-
national trade, a trademark symbolizes the geographically distinct
goodwill of the domestic owner of the mark.10 3 The exhaustion
theory does not apply as long as the United States trademark owner
has established an independent goodwill.O4
In private trademark litigation, courts determine the existence
of independent goodwill on a case-by-case basis.10 5 The language
of section 526, however, encompasses all domestic trademark own-
ers. Thus, broad enforcement of section 526 as a trademark law10 6
requires the assumption that United States trademark owners, as a
class, have demonstrated such geographically distinct goodwill.
Most segments of the gray market reflect the validity of this
assumption.107
Parallel importation is most pronounced when there is a large
disparity between the costs of shipping products into this country
and the costs incurred by authorized United States distributors in
marketing those products.1 08 The markets most prone to gray mar-
fore protects consumers from .competitive excesses. In contrast, antitrust law protects con-
sumers at the other end of the spectrum by ensuring aggressive competition.
102 See Lewin, supra note 54, at 2.
103 See note 16 supra.
104 See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 706-13 (D.N.J. 1985);
Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171-74. See also Note, supra note 23, at 108-09.
105 See, e.g., Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 711-13; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171-74.
106 Despite Congress' attaching § 526 to a customs law, little dispute exists that it is a
trademark law. The unfair competition inherent in Katzel stimulated the adoption of § 526.
See notes 10 and 16 supra and accompanying text. The statute is closely related, by history,
cross-reference, and otherwise, to § 42 of the Lanham Act and is administered by the Cus-
toms Service under the same regulations. Both trademark owners and the Government
now concur that § 526 is indeed a trademark law. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 34,
COPIAT, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984).
107 It is improbable that all United States trademark owners have established such in-
dependent goodwill. However, analysis of the proper scope of § 526 must account for le-
gitimate trademark expectations in the majority of situations encompassed by the statute.
Full enforcement of § 526 could be overinclusive to the extent that some mark owners may
not have established independent goodwill. But, if these mark owners represent only a
small minority of cases, it is preferable to protect the intellectual property rights of the
majority under the statute. Where such independent goodwill is in doubt, the protections
of the statute may be denied on a case-by-case basis.
108 Some of the most heavily publicized markets are cameras, optics, home electronics
products, watches, perfumes, batteries, and tires. See Lexecon, supra note 4, at 2. In these
markets, The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) has
reported that domestic marketing expenditures ranged from 8% to 25%o of the distributor's
United States sales price (3% to 14%o of this total was advertising alone). In contrast, ship-
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ket importation possess several common characteristics. 09 They
are generally competitive markets in which the exclusive American
distributors have chosen to invest heavily in both informational and
promotional advertising. Many of these markets involve relatively
sophisticated product lines which require substantial attention to
product quality. The selection and training of a specialized group
of distributors appears to be common. Finally, most of these prod-
ucts require warranty protection. In each of these areas, trademark
owners have committed substantial funds to marketing and distri-
bution. These pre-sale and post-sale investments contribute di-
rectly to the creation and maintenance of market reputation and
promote interbrand competition.
Most trademark owners in the gray market can thus demon-
strate independent goodwill and a favorable reputation in the eyes
of consumers. The greater the trademark owner's investment in
building and maintaining goodwill, the greater the profit potential
for a parallel importer. The result is free riding by the gray
marketeer on those investments. 1 0 This free riding reduces the
trademark owner's incentive to invest in informative advertising,
distributor training, quality control, warranty services, and develop-
ment of new product opportunities."'
The vulnerability of trademark owners to gray market importa-
tion increases in direct proportion to their successful investment in
furthering interbrand competition. The exclusion of parallel im-
ports by enforcement of section 526 eliminates this free riding
ping costs to the United States accounted for only 1% of the distributor's United States
sales price. See id. at 10-11. See also Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1176.
The International Trade Commission has taken the position that economic considera-
tions do not support gray market imports because: "(1) monopolistic price discrimination
rarely exists and ignores demand; (2) price differences are justified by differences in serv-
ices and investments; [and] (3) grey market goods get a 'free ride' on the reputation en-
joyed by the mark .... " M. Noll, Gray Market Imports, Address To the Second Annual
Judicial Conference of the U.S. Ct. of Int'l Trade, Oct. 23, 1985, reported at 31 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 755, at 36 (Nov. 14, 1985).
109 See cases cited at note 33 supra.
110 See note 96 supra. The gray marketeer gains from the use of the trademark, and all
that it entails, without paying for it. He free rides on the brand advertising and promotion
of the authorized distributor and need only advertise low prices. In rebuttal, gray market-
eers argue that they advertise heavily. See Lewin, supra note 54, at 20; Brief for 47th Street
Photo, Inc., supra note 23, at 5; Brief for Amicus Curiae Progress Trading Company, Inc. at
11, COPIAT, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984). Such advertising, however, promotes
multiple product lines and low prices. It derives its value from the fact that consumers are
already aware of the trademarked goods and their qualities. Thus, gray marketeer advertis-
ing is evidence of free riding, not a negation of it.
111 See 31 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 755, at 36 (Nov. 14, 1985) (re-
porting International Trade Commission position that "[g]rey market goods will lead to
reduced investments in trademarks and products" and trademark owners' contention that
"investments in trademarks-which can be as high as 27 percent of the price of the prod-
uct-will diminish if the [gray market] goods are not excluded.").
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problem. But prevention of free riding represents only one side of
the balance. Protection of consumer interests is also vitally
important.
B. Protection of Consumer Interests in the Gray Market
A trademark serves consumer interests by differentiating the
trademark owner's goods and preventing the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion.' 12 At the same time, consumer and societal inter-
ests favor vigorous competition which offers the consumer lower
prices. While the interests of trademark owners and consumers in
preventing confusion are identical, their interests may conflict re-
garding competition and product pricing.
1. Likelihood of Confusion or Deception
Because parallel importers sell genuine trademarked goods,
they argue that there is no possibility, much less likelihood, of con-
fusion as to source of origin of the goods. 11 Modem trademark
law does not support this narrow view of confusion. The gray mar-
ket involves the likelihood of consumer confusion as to both source
and quality.
The "source function" of a trademark encompasses more than
the geographic origin of the goods. 114 As a result of modem mar-
keting and distribution techniques, "a 'genuine' article to the mod-
em consumer connotes not only the source of manufacture but also
the chain of selection, distribution, and servicing upon which he has
112 See, e.g., International Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg, 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th
Cir. 1980) ("[Ihe 'property right' or protection accorded a trademark owner can only be
understood in the context of trademark law and its purposes. A trademark owner has a
property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion."); James Bur-
rough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Trademark laws
exist not to 'protect' trademarks, but.., to protect the consuming public from confusion,
concomitantly protecting the trademark owner's right to a non-confused public."). See gen-
erally 1 J. McCARThY, supra note 96, § 2:6.
113 The courts are split on the question of whether genuine goods can cause confusion.
For discussions of courts finding confusion, see Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692 (1923); Well, 618 F.
Supp. at 704; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167-70; Bell &Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1071. For
discussions by other courts questioning whether any confusion may exist in genuine goods,
see Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 46; Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l, 707 F.2d 1054,
1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying California law); DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d
621, 622 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
1380, 1394 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
114 See note 98 supra. Section 32 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act provides additional
support. Section 32 originally required a showing that the infringing use was likely to con-
fuse or deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods and services. In 1962,
Congress amended § 32, deleting the source of origin requirement, demonstrating a clear
purpose "to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake or
deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin." Syntex
Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971).
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been able to rely in the past."' 1 5 The authorized distributor is the
"sponsor" of the trademarked good and provides many ancillary
services. Confusion is likely to result if the gray marketeer does not
disclose that he is not the authorized distributor or that he does not
offer the warranty protection or services which the consumer has
come to expect. 16
The "quality function" of the trademark does not replace the
"source function," but stands alongside it as a "guarantee" of con-
sistent quality. 17 In the gray market, genuine trademarked goods
possess identical product quality when shipped from the factory.
Product quality, however, is not simply measured at the factory: it
is also determined at the time of retail sale. Thus, many trademark
owners invest in product quality through careful shipping, storage,
inventory control, and quality control.' 18 This investment is a natu-
ral adjunct of the desire to protect the reputation of the product.
In contrast, gray marketeers may unknowingly sell inferior products
because they provide less quality control and have less incentive to
make such expenditures. 19 Inferior products confuse and deceive
the consumer and his expectations are disappointed.1 20
Gray market products therefore are only superficially identical
to goods supplied by authorized distributors. By virtue of the
trademark owner's commitment to pre-sale quality control and
post-sale warranties and service, he is in fact selling a different
115 Callman, Another Look at the Unlawful Importations of Trademarked Articles, 52 TRADEMARK
REP. 556, 561 n.15 (1962).
116 The United States trademark owner who offers warranty and repair services to his
customers faces major problems as a result of consumer confusion. He can restrict his
services to those who purchased goods through authorized outlets, but if he does so, he
may engender hostility to the mark and lower its value in the marketplace. On the other
hand, if he chooses to honor warranty requests from consumers who purchased from gray
market importers, he has increased his investment in marketing, making him even more
vulnerable to free riding by parallel importers.
117 See note 99 supra. Parallel importers are likely to cause confusion as to the identity of
the company standing behind and insuring the quality of the trademarked goods. See Bell &
Howell, 548 F. Supp at 1071.
118 See, e.g., Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 711-12; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1165-68; Complainant
Duracell Inc.'s Post Hearing Brief at 18-22, In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-
TA-165 (U.S. ITC 1984).
119 See Callman, supra note 115, at 561 n.15 ("If varying articles appear under the same
trademark in the same country, because goods destined for country A are imported into
country B, the public will be confused with respect to the article's identity or 'genuineness.'
Here the infringement attacks the trademark's guarantee function; the public, which be-
lieves that all goods bearing the same mark come from the same source and are of the same
quality, will be misled."). This confusion results in deterioration of reputation and lost
future sales, costs which are borne by the U.S. trademark owner.
120 This situation could develop where, for example, goods are damaged in transit,
goods are not designed for the United States market (foreign language instruction manuals,
improper power cords, etc.), see, e.g., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1169, or where goods are
sensitive to storage/shipping conditions and deteriorate in quality, see, e.g., Post Hearing
Brief, supra note 118, at 18-22.
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product than that offered by the gray marketeer. When the con-
sumer comes to expect such services, confusion rather than differ-
entiation results from gray market importation.
2. Competition and Product Pricing
It is imprecise to define a trademark as a "monopoly conferred
by law."' 12 A trademark right is not a monopoly right "in the anti-
trust sense of an evil anticompetitive monopoly."' 22 The trade-
mark right simply provides the exclusive right to use the mark in
commerce; it does not by itself confer either market power or mo-
nopoly power over competition or prices.
In the gray market, the United States trademark rights are
often owned by exclusive distributors affiliated with foreign prod-
uct manufacturers. Parallel importers have thus argued that prohi-
bition of gray market importation will foster "anti-competitive
practices, discriminatory pricing, and violations of antitrust laws
and policy."' 23 While overstated, these contentions warrant careful
scrutiny.
Parallel importers argue that enforcement of section 526
would allow related companies to engage in an international con-
spiracy to divide world markets in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.' 24 This contention is without merit. Conspiracies to
divide world markets are actionable where there is agreement
among horizontal competitors. 25 But the Supreme Court has held
that a parent and subsidiary cannot conspire with one another
within the meaning of the antitrust laws.' 26 And the Antitrust Divi-
sion has stated that "a parent corporation may rationally allocate
territories or set prices for the subsidiaries it fully controls."' 27
Thus, in the typical gray market situation, a multinational corpora-
tion may establish an exclusive distribution system among its na-
121 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1176.
122 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 96, § 2:5.
123 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1176.
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is ... illegal.").
125 See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Timken involved an agreement between related hori-
zontal competitors to divide world markets, but the agreement between the parties arose
before there was any relationship between them. Sealy involved a group of competitors who
formed a joint venture "parent company" to exploit the trademark and enforce agreed-
upon exclusive territories. Neither case involved a multinational parent company structur-
ing its vertical distribution operations through a series of foreign subsidiaries. Instead,
both cases involved agreement by horizontally situated actual or potential competitors.
126 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
127 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS 12 (1977).
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tionally organized marketing subsidiaries. 128  Such action does not
constitute an unlawful conspiracy to divide world markets.
In a related argument, parallel importers contend that enforce-
ment of section 526 to restrict gray market imports encourages un-
reasonable vertical restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 129 This argument disregards interbrand competition
and focuses primarily upon the undesirable impact of exclusive dis-
tributor agreements on intrabrand competition. Exclusive distribu-
torships establish vertical restraints which were at one time
considered per se violations of the Sherman Act.'3 0 Courts, how-
ever, now analyze such arrangements under the antitrust "rule of
reason." While exclusive distributor agreements limit in-
trabrand competition, they may promote more aggressive inter-
brand competition. 32 It is now well accepted that such exclusive
distributor agreements may be lawful and economically efficient to
the extent that they facilitate interbrand competition. 33
Parallel importers further suggest that the exclusion of gray
market goods under authority of section 526 would aggravate price
discrimination against United States consumers. 34 Under this the-
ory, international trademark owners currently victimize consumers
by unilaterally charging higher prices in the United States than in
128 See In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, reported at [July-Dec] ITrr'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) no. 9, at 239 (Aug. 29, 1984) (U.S. ITC Aug. 10, 1984) (initial decision)
(relying upon Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. 2731, to conclude that Duracell and its wholly owned
subsidiary could not conspire with each other in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act).
129 See Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc., supra note 23, at 50-53; Victor, supra note 31, at
801-02.
130 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Courts
treated vertical distribution arrangements by manufacturers similarly to horizontal agree-
ments among distributors to restrain geographic competition. This view was heavily criti-
cized. See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282
(1975).
131 The antitrust "rule of reason" as applied to non-price vertical restraints was adopted
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), overruling Schwinn, 388
U.S. 365. Today, "the legality of a vertical restraint in each case depends upon its eco-
nomic effect, assessed under a 'rule-of-reason' standard." U.S. Department ofJustice, Verti-
cal Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1985). Thus, in analyzing non-price vertical
restraints, courts compare the effects upon interbrand and intrabrand competition. See Pos-
ner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L.
REv. 6 (1981); Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. 2731; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104
S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
132 See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59.
133 There are many legitimate business reasons why a United States distributor and a
foreign manufacturer would choose to do business through an exclusive distributor ar-
rangement. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54 (listing several beneficial characteristics of ver-
tical restraints). Judges Posner, Bork, and Easterbrook have each proposed that exclusive
distribution by manufacturers should generally be declared lawful. See generally Bork, Verti-
cal Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171; Posner, supra note 131; Easter-
brook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
134 See, e.g., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166.
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other countries 13 5 Parallel importers argue that, if parallel imports
are barred, even higher prices might result. But the mere fact that
gray market goods cost less in foreign markets does not prove the
existence of anti-competitive international price discrimination.
Rather, higher United States prices result primarily from greater
marketing investments made in the United States by trademark
owners than in other countries.136 While it is true that international
price discrimination may exist in the gray market, such discrimina-
tion is only feasible in situations where market power and minimal
interbrand competition exist.'3 7 As the International Trade Com-
mission has stated, "monopolistic price discrimination rarely ex-
ists" in the gray market. 38
Parallel importers also suggest that trademark rights will be
used to facilitate a horizontal restraint of trade, allowing competi-
tors acting in concert to prevent gray market importation and re-
strict competition.13 9 If such action were by express agreement
within an international cartel, the antitrust laws would provide
proper remedies. 40 But the mere fact that trademark owners act in
a parallel manner to protect their trademark rights under authority
of section 526 would be insufficient evidence of such restraint.' 4 '
Admittedly, the antitrust laws do not protect against mere con-
135 See Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United States
Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 308 (1969) ("Different arms of the same com-
pany should not be able to maintain two separate price structures for the same product, one
price being above that which the market would seek if importers could compete freely.").
Anti-competitive price discrimination occurs when sellers receive a different margin of
price over cost from different purchasers. The Robinson-Patman Amendment to § 2 of the
Clayton Act proscribes the practice of price discrimination. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). In-
ternational price discrimination by a world trademark owner, to the extent it may exist, is
generally beyond the reach of Robinson-Patman protections. Transfers from a parent to its
subsidiaries are not considered separate sales for Robinson-Patman purposes. See Security
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1979). Even if
such transfers were treated as separate sales, .genuine goods which were originally sold by
the manufacturer for resale only in a foreign country would not fall within the scope of the
statute.
136 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
137 If aggressive interbrand competition exists in the United States, attempts by a for-
eign trademark owner to discriminate in price against the United States market would be
counter-productive. Interbrand competitors would simply undercut such discriminatory
prices and thus reduce the market share of the foreign trademark owner. Therefore, the
key practical consideration is whether the trademark owner can exercise market power over
the relevant product market; i.e., whether he can raise prices above a competitive level
without a substantial loss of business to substitutes or competitors. For a discussion of
market power considerations, see Graphics Products Distrib. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560,
1570 (11 th Cir. 1983); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745
(7th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1982).
138 Noll, supra note 108, at 36.
139 See Victor, supra note 31, at 801-02.
140 See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
141 See Victor, supra note 31, at 801-02.
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scious parallelism where foreign companies act independently to
restrict competition or maintain high prices in the United States.1 42
These concerns may be valid in markets where the domestic indus-
try is an oligopoly, the foreign manufacturers are heavily concen-
trated in one foreign country, and where the policies of that
country encourage industry-wide cooperation. The decision to en-
force section 526 must therefore take these concerns into account.
Although price discrimination and conscious parallelism may
exist in some cases, parallel importers overstate their antitrust ar-
guments as applied to the entire gray market. Parallel importers,
however, respond with a persuasive consumer-oriented policy argu-
ment. They contend that exclusion of gray market goods under
section 526 would foreclose the availability of lower cost genuine
goods and would be detrimental to consumers. 143 Under this view,
consumers have purchased gray market goods specifically because
of lower prices. 14 4 The magnitude of the existing gray market 45
provides strong evidence of broad consumer interest in such
goods.146 The question raised is thus whether enforcement of sec-
tion 526 is likely to result in reduced prices of authorized goods
comparable to those now offered in the gray market.
To justify enforcement of section 526 to its full breadth, the
elimination of intrabrand competition should increase interbrand
142 Parallel business behavior does not itself violate the Sherman Act. Likewise, mere
conscious price parallelism is not itself unlawful. See, e.g., Esco Corp. v. United States, 340
F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965). The mere opportunity to conspire, in the context of paral-
lel pricing, is not necessarily probative evidence of conspiracy. See, e.g., Weit v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1981). The inference of unlawful
agreement rather than individual business judgment must be the compelling, if not exclu-
sive, rational inference. Id. at 463.
143 See Brief for 47th Street Photo, Inc., supra note 23, at 4-5. Parallel importers provide
"significant savings to American consumers" and have established businesses in reliance on
the "existing state of the law" and "government's long-standing commitment to free trade
in such goods." Id. See also Victor, supra note 31, at 803.
144 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167 (gray market sales "are based solely on price advan-
tage"); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D. Fla.
1983) ("[T]he Court would be doing the public a disservice by preventing the dissemina-
tion of ... equally good, yet less expensive [gray market] products."); Note, Trade-mark
Infringement: The Power of an American Trade-mark Owner to Prevent the Importation of the Authentic
Product Manufactured by a Foreign Company, 64 YALE LJ. 557, 564 (1955) (the enforcement of
§ 526 by related companies "merely results in higher prices to consumers").
145 The gray market has grown dramatically during the 1980s and is now well estab-
lished. See Riley, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2 (gray market accounts for 33% of the camera
market); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 916 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (K-
Mart purchases $250-300 million of gray market goods per year).
146 Several consumer groups have argued for continued gray market importation. See,
e.g., Letters to the U.S. Dept. of the Treasury from Consumers Union (publishers of Con-
sumer Reports) (Jan. 8, 1983), Public Citizen (July 28, 1983), and Consumers for World
Trade (May 19, 1983), reprinted in Memorandum for 47th Street Photo, Inc. in Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, App. at 52-59, COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844
(D.D.C. 1984).
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competition to an extent beneficial to consumers. The major rea-
son for higher domestic prices of authorized goods is the market-
justified price differenc6 caused by aggressive interbrand competi-
tion in such goods. 147 Because fierce interbrand competition al-
ready exists in most markets subject to gray market importation,
price competition among authorized distributors would be unlikely
to intensify to any significant extent in the absence of gray market
goods.1 48 In fact, the reverse is true. Authorized distributors have
greater incentives to reduce prices when faced with competition
from lower-priced gray market goods. 149 Thus, substantially lower
authorized distributor prices would not logically result from the
curtailment of gray market imports. Enforcement of section 526 to
its full reach could thus have the effect of eliminating intrabrand
competition without sufficiently increasing interbrand price compe-
tition. Such a result would be detrimental to consumer interests.
The resulting policy balance is complex. If current policies re-
main in effect, the consumer will benefit from intrabrand competi-
tion and lower-priced gray market goods. In addition, the dangers
of price discrimination and conscious parallelism would be mini-
mized. But the free riding problem will continue to unfairly burden
affected trademark owners. The consumer will continue to suffer
from lack of full disclosure and likelihood of confusion. In contrast,
enforcing section 526 to prohibit gray market imports would re-
solve the free riding and confusion problems. Consumers, how-
ever, will be denied the benefits of lower prices because intrabrand
competition would be curtailed without any likelihood that result-
ing interbrand competition would stimulate substantially lower
prices.
IV. Alternative Solutions
Although section 526 is enforceable as a matter of law, policy
considerations dictate that neither a blanket exclusion of gray mar-
ket imports nor a continuation of the status quo strikes an equitable
147 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
148 The curtailment of gray market imports would stimulate interbrand competition to a
certain extent. Trademark owners would have renewed incentives to invest in pre-sale ad-
vertising and quality control and post-sale warranties and services. See note 111 supra and
accompanying text. Arguably, however, the restoration of such competitive incentives
would translate into lower consumer prices. At best, some price reduction might be antici-
pated, but the magnitude of any such price decrease is not likely to approach the level of
discounting currently offered by gray marketeers.
149 When the trademark owner suffers diversion of sales as a result of gray market im-
portation, his share of both the branded product market and the relevant interbrand prod-
uct market deteriorates. To maintain net profits at prior levels, he must either reduce
overhead costs or expand his aggregate market share. To gain market share, an obvious
alternative is to reduce prices, thereby increasing intrabrand price competition and under-
cutting interbrand competitor prices.
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balance between the protection of trademark rights and the inter-
ests of consumers. A proper resolution of the conflict should mini-
mize free riding on trademark owners' goodwill, protect consumers
from likelihood of confusion, and allow continued importation of
gray market goods. Such a solution should protect the value inher-
ent in the mark-and only the mark -without restricting the availa-
bility of gray market goods. At the same time, the policy solution
must be simple to enforce and must be economically efficient.
The Vivitar court recognized that unfair competition is com-
mon in the gray market' 50 and suggested that trademark rights be
enforced in private litigation rather than by enforcement of section
526.' 51 Neither trademark owners nor parallel importers support
this approach. 5 2 Instead, both groups urge definitive resolution of
the scope of the statute. While private litigation is not totally un-
reasonable given all of the possibilities in international trade, 5 3
consumer confusion and free riding will continue in most gray
markets.
The Vivitar solution therefore invites a legislative change.
Because neither the status quo nor full enforcement of section 526
is desirable and judicial remedies are inadequate, a compromise
policy solution and subsequent congressional action are required.
At present, the Reagan Administration is considering two possible
solutions: 154 (1) a "labeling" policy requiring importers to label
their products as neither authorized nor warranted by the domestic
150 761 F.2d at 1570 ("It appears to us that § 1526(a) may be developing on a case-by-
case basis into protection against sui generis types of unfair competition in international
trade." (footnotes omitted)). The acknowledged purpose of § 526 was to address the ineq-
uities of unfair competition inherent in Katzel. See notes 10 and 15 supra and accompanying
text. See also Nolan-Haley, The Competitive Process and Gray Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L. ScH.J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 231, 250 (1984) ("[T]he phenomenon of gray market goods is ... a species of
unfair competition."). But cf Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 435 ("Free riding is regulated under
the Lanham Act ... and other statutory law .... There is no evidence that Congress
intended [§ 526 as an additional remedy for violations of the law of unfair competition],
and the court declines to so interpret it.").
151 761 F.2d at 1570.
152 See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 106, at 29-31; Brief for 47th Street
Photo, Inc., supra note 23, at 57 ("[The Federal Circuit] opinion is likely to spawn many
private lawsuits that will harass importers ... and will unnecessarily burden the courts.").
To demonstrate the validity of this observation, see Critser, supra note 3, at 19 ("In 1985
alone, Coleco Industries filed at least 10 gray market suits against unauthorized importers
of Cabbage Patch Kids . . . . The strategy ... is to establish legal precedents by moving
against small importers that can't afford a costly defense."). See also Note, supra note 23, at
110-11 (private litigation is inadequate because identification of importers is often difficult
and because trademark owners will be required to bring an endless series of lawsuits).
153 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
154 See note 32 supra. See also 31 PAT. TRADEMARK COPYRIGHTJ. No. 755, at 36 (Nov. 14,
1985); Riley, supra note 3, at 23, col. 2. Other solutions have been proposed, but they have
not received serious attention. See Note, supra note 23, at 111-15.
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trademark owner; or (2) a "demarking" policy requiring that the
trademark be removed or obliterated prior to importation.
To eliminate the likelihood of consumer confusion, clear label-
ing of gray market goods should be required. The labeling should
disclose that the gray market goods are not sponsored by the au-
thorized distributor and that warranties, repair services, or rebates
are not available from that source. 155 A labeling policy provides an
administratively simple "bright line" standard which reduces con-
sumer confusion and yet allows gray market importation to con-
tinue. Arguably, however, labeling provides insufficient protection
against consumer confusion and free riding. The extent of such
protection depends largely upon the disclosure requirements
adopted under a labeling policy. Labels must be conspicuous and
must educate the consumer as to all ramifications of purchase from
a gray marketeer. If labeling fails to inform consumers of any im-
portant differences between the authorized and unauthorized
goods, some confusion and free riding will continue. 156 In the lat-
ter case, a labeling policy is under-protective of both trademark
rights and consumer interests.
To provide broader protection against confusion and free rid-
ing, trademark owners have advocated "demarking" of the
goods. 157 Consistent with existing provisions of both section
155 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 218-aa (McKinney Supp. 1986). The New York legis-
lation requires retailers of gray market goods to disclose lack of manufacturer warranties
and rebates. The legislature limited the law to articles of personal consumption and re-
quires point of purchase signs or labeling. In the case of mail order retailers, the law re-
quires such disclosure in advertisements. Violations are punishable by small fines and
consumer refunds or credits. The statute offers an affirmative defense if the gray marketeer
provides a written warranty offering equal or greater protection than that provided by the
manufacturer. Id.
156 For example, the recent New York legislation, id., provides insufficient protections
against consumer confusion and free riding. The law requires disclosure of gray market
status only for consumer products and only if the products are sold without manufacturer
warranties, rebates, or English instructions. Id. This disclosure is inadequate and ignores
potential differences in quality. Full disclosure demands labeling of all trademarked goods
imported or sold without the trademark owner's consent. Such a requirement ensures elim-
ination of confusion by alerting all consumers to the unauthorized status of the goods and
possible differences in quality.
The affirmative defense provided in the legislation creates administrative problems and
may result in inadequate protections against confusion and free riding. If the gray
marketeer offers an equal or better warranty than that offered by the manufacturer, he is
not required to label or otherwise disclose the status of the goods. Enforcement of such a
provision is subjective and destroys the "bright line" nature of the statute. In addition, an
affirmative defense based upon warranties would not protect consumers who are denied
manufacturer rebates. Thus, the affirmative defense is ill advised. A proper disclosure stat-
ute should requupon warranties would not protect consumers who are denied
manufacturer rebates. Thus, the affirmative defense is ill advised. A proper disclosure stat-
ute should require labeling of all gray market goods. The gray marketeer may offer his own
warranties, but this should not circumvent the labeling requirement. Consumer confusion
and free riding may only be avoided by allowing consumers, in all instances, to make a fully
informed choice.
157 See Riley, supra note 3, at 22, col. 1.
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526158 and the customs regulations,1 59 this solution would allow im-
portation of gray market goods only if the trademark is removed,
covered, or otherwise obliterated. Although trademark owners
claim that demarking is relatively inexpensive, 60 complete de-
marking is often impractical. 161 Demarking eliminates confusion
and free riding, but would have the likely effect of sharply curtailing
gray market imports. 162 Thus, a demarking policy is over-protec-
tive of trademark rights and detrimental to consumers.
Neither labeling nor complete demarking alone may be fully
satisfactory. If, however, combined together under a hybrid de-
marking/labeling policy, a practical balancing of interests may be
possible. This approach would require the parallel importer to re-
move or cover the trademark, but only to the extent feasible. 63 If
such removal or covering was not practical in the judgment of the
Customs Service, the importer would be required to affix appropri-
ate labels. Hybrid demarking/labeling overcomes the objections of
gray marketeers to a pure demarking requirement 64 and may af-
ford greater protection to both trademark owners and consumers
than labeling alone.1 65 Such a policy solution, however, does not
158 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982) states:
Any person dealing in any such merchandise [defined in § 526(a)] may be enjoined
from dealing therein within the United States or may be required to export or
destroy such merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark and shall be
liable for the same damages and profits provided for wrongful use of a trade-mark
159 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(4) (1985) provides that importation is allowed when "[t]he
objectionable mark is removed or obliterated prior to importation in such a manner as to
be illegible and incapable of being reconstituted, for example by: (i) [girinding off im-
printed trademarks wherever they appear; (ii) [r]emoving and disposing of plates bearing a
trademark or tradename."
160 "COPIAT has investigated the feasibility of the demarking proposal and determined
that practically all of its members' products could be demarked at low cost (a few pennies
per unit) without compromising the products' physical integrity or appearance." Lexecon,
supra note 4, at 85.
161 See Lewin, supra note 54, at 21-23. Lewin argues against a demarking requirement on
the grounds that it would be far too expensive to cover or obliterate every trademark.
Under a demarking policy, manufacturers would have every incentive to place the marks
where they could not be obliterated without destroying the marketability of the product.
162 See id. See also Note, supra note 23, at 114-15.
163 See Lexecon, supra note 4, at 84.
164 Under the hybrid demarking/Iabeling solution, the marks only need to be removed
to the extent feasible. This solution reduces the costs of demarking by vesting discretion in
the Customs Service. As for the incentives for the manufacturer to put the trademarks in
"hard to cover" areas (see note 161 supra), such an effort would have just the opposite effect
because the manufacturer would then be only entitled to labeling.
165 A hybrid demarking/labeling policy provides greater protections against consumer
confusion and free riding than provided by the recent New York legislation. See note 155
supra. On the other hand, if the disclosure requirements under a labeling policy were made
more stringent as suggested at note 156 supra, the labeling policy would be preferable. The
administrative simplicity of the labeling solution would outweigh the incremental protec-
tions against free riding offered under the hybrid policy.
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provide a "bright line" rule. It vests discretion in the Customs Ser-
vice to determine the appropriate extent of demarking for each
gray market product. As a result, this approach is likely to be costly
to administer, may result in different standards for every product,
and could breed substantial litigation. 166 Thus, while such a solu-
tion may be theoretically desirable, it has several practical and ad-
ministrative drawbacks.
None of the proposed options is ideal. A properly designed
labeling policy, however, is the best solution available. Labeling is
administratively simple and is consistent with current country of or-
igin product marking requirements. 167 Labeling allows continued
gray market importation and offers greater protections to trade-
mark owners and consumers than the status quo. The effectiveness
of the labeling solution depends largely upon the stringency of the
labeling requirements. 68 To the extent that it adequately informs
consumers, labeling eliminates consumer confusion and minimizes
free riding. Some free riding will continue to exist, but the gray
marketeer will be forced to convince informed consumers that par-
allel imports offer a viable alternative to authorized goods. This
solution properly shifts much of the burden to the gray marketeer
to achieve success largely as a result of his own marketing and dis-
tribution efforts rather than as a result of free riding.
V. Conclusion
As a matter of law, section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is a
valid statute enacted by Congress to protect the property rights of
American trademark owners by barring the importation of trade-
marked goods without the trademark owner's consent. Customs
regulations which limit the scope of this statute are ultra vires to the
extent that they improperly discriminate against American trade-
mark owners who are affiliated with a foreign manufacturer. The
regulations cannot be supported on the grounds of agency author-
ity, legislative history, antitrust precedent, deference to agency in-
terpretation, congressional acquiescence, or discretionary enforce-
ment.
However, consideration of the policies underlying protection
166 Trademark owners argue that "[t]here would no doubt be 'close cases' to decide
regarding the appropriate extent.., of product demarking, [but] Customs already makes
product labeling decisions under country of origin marking requirements quite similar to
those it would make under a demarking policy." Lexecon, supra note 4, at 90. This argu-
ment, however, understates the administrative difficulties and costs involved in analyzing
the extent of demarking required for every gray market product. In addition, the discretion
vested in the Customs Service under a hybrid (or demarking) standard is considerably
broader than under a labeling standard.
167 See 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 134.32 (1985).
168 See notes 155-56 supra and accompanying text.
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of intellectual property rights and consumer interests suggests that
section 526 should not be enforced to the full extent of the law.
Although trademark owners would be protected from free riding if
gray market imports were barred, consumers would be denied the
availability of lower priced gray market goods without any corre-
sponding decreases in prices of authorized goods. In contrast, al-
lowing unrestricted gray market importation under the status quo
does not adequately protect trademark owners from free riding and
promotes consumer deception and confusion.
The most practical solution is a stringent labeling requirement
that educates consumers regarding all of the ramifications of the
purchase of gray market goods. Labeling protects trademark own-
ers by minimizing free riding, protects consumer interests by elimi-
nating confusion, and allows the continued importation of gray
market goods.
John A. Young, Jr.
